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CLD-237        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1138 
___________ 
 
CRAIG KINARD, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
 SECURITY LIEUTENANT  BAKOS; THOMPSON, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-13-cv-00260) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 24, 2014 
 
Before:  FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 5, 2014) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Craig Kinard, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the District 
Court’s orders dismissing his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 
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denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
will summarily affirm.
1
   
I. 
 Craig Kinard, a Pennsylvania prisoner, filed an amended complaint pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that on March 19, 2013, two correctional officers (the named 
defendants) engaged in a contraband search of his cell.  Kinard was handcuffed and stood 
outside the cell during the search.  He observed Defendant Thompson open an envelope 
labeled “legal mail confidential” and read the enclosed materials.  Defendant Thompson 
then summoned Defendant Bakos, who allegedly also read the materials in the envelope 
designated as legal mail.  These materials allegedly pertained to a separate § 1983 suit in 
which Defendant Bakos was also named as a defendant.  After he had read the legal 
materials, Defendant Bakos allegedly said to another correctional officer, “That Kinard 
knows about the camera footage, it’s all in his proof and evidence pages.”  Kinard alleged 
that these events violated his right under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches.  The Magistrate Judge recommended 
that Kinard’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice, and the District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation.  Kinard then moved under Federal Rule 
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may 
summarily affirm a decision of the District Court if the appeal does not raise a substantial 
issue.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  We may affirm on any basis supported by the 
record.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).   
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of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment.  The District Court denied the 
motion, and Kinard timely appealed.   
II.  
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order.  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Because Kinard’s timely appeal from the 
denial of his motion for reconsideration “brings up the underlying judgment for review,” 
McAlister v. Sentry Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 550, 552–53 (3d Cir. 1992), we will review the 
District Court’s dismissal of Kinard’s complaint, as well as its denial of his motion for 
reconsideration.  We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of 
discretion.  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant 
to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  See Allah, 229 F.3d at 223. Dismissal is appropriate 
where the pleader has not alleged “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(internal quotations omitted).   The standard requires a two-part analysis.  First, we 
separate the complaint’s factual allegations from its legal conclusions.  Having done that, 
we take only the factual allegations as true and determine whether the plaintiff has 
alleged a plausible claim for relief.  See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-
11 (3d Cir. 2009).   
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 Upon review, we conclude that the District Court properly determined that Kinard 
failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim.  The Supreme Court of the United States has 
stated unequivocally that “the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable 
searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell. The recognition of privacy 
rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept 
of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institutions.”  Hudson v. Palmer, 
468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984).  The search that gave rise to Kinard’s lawsuit was therefore not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.   
 In addition to failing to constitute a viable Fourth Amendment claim, the facts 
alleged his complaint cannot support any other cause of action.  We agree with the 
Magistrate Judge that a search could be so intrusive as to violate an inmate’s Eighth 
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, or that an ongoing 
practice of opening and reading inmates’ legal mail could present a First Amendment 
issue.  See id. at 530 (stating that the Eighth Amendment prevents prison attendants from 
“rid[ing] roughshod over inmates’ property rights with impunity.”); Jones v. Brown, 461 
F.3d 353, 355 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that state prisoners have an interest protected by 
the First Amendment in being present when their incoming legal mail is opened).  
Neither of those situations is present in the instant case.  Nor can Kinard show that his 
access to the courts has been hampered, because a viable claim of that type requires an 
inmate to demonstrate that he was actually injured.  See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 
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349 (1996).  The rule that an actual injury must be shown applies when a claim regarding 
access to the courts is grounded on a prison’s alleged interference with legal mail.  See 
Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 1997).  A plaintiff can demonstrate actual 
injury by alleging that the defendants’ actions resulted in the “loss or rejection of a legal 
claim.”  Id. at 177.  As Kinard has not pleaded facts that would give rise to any of the 
aforementioned claims, the dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim was 
proper.   
 Finally, we agree with the District Court’s denial of Kinard’s motion for 
reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which we review for 
abuse of discretion.  A motion for reconsideration “must rely on one of three grounds: (1) 
an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the 
need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”  Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 
669.  Kinard did not identify any of these factors; instead, he merely reiterated his 
previous argument.  Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the District 
Court’s denial of Kinard’s motion.   
III. 
 There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily 
affirm.     
 
